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“This is a Game”: A History of the Foreign
Terrorist Organization and State Sponsors of
Terrorism Lists and their Applications
By Melissa Sanford
Abstract: Following the post-September 11 United States
reconfiguration of foreign policy, the use of the State Department’s
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and State Sponsors of
Terrorism (SST) lists and related news media coverage
dramatically increased. Considering the gravity of such
designations, both because of the potentially devastating economic
ramifications in the form of sanctions and as negative P.R., it is
imperative to examine the historical use and application of these
lists. This paper seeks to help better determine the legitimacy of
being designated on either of these lists through the analysis of two
entities that have experienced listing: the Mujahedeen-e Khalq
(MEK) and the country of Iraq. Examination of these two cases
reveals the role of strategic relationships with the U.S. government
in terrorism designations and exposes the reality that, in these
particular instances, the FTO and SST have been wielded as
mechanisms of U.S. foreign policy rather than applied as
legitimate safeguards. In the context of current U.S.-Iran relations,
and U.S. foreign policy as a whole, it is essential to better
understand the validity of the U.S. State Department terrorism
designation based on the history of the circumstances surrounding
previous applications.

At the 2019 Munich Security Conference, a yearly forum held to
discuss the world’s most urgent security issues, growing tensions
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between Iran and the United States, which resulted from the U.S’s
unilateral pullout from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), dominated much of the conversation. Iranian Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif made a statement to the
conference wherein he pointed out the illegality of the United
States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. role in increasing
regional tensions and conflict, as well as the 40-year history of
U.S. “demonization” of Iran. In the Q&A session following his
speech, Zarif provided the example of the listing of Iran and the
listing and delisting of Iraq and the MEK on the United States
terrorism lists as central examples of the seemingly erratically
applied terrorist designation:
In 1984, the United States removed Saddam
Hussein from its terrorism list and put Iran on it’s
the (sic) terrorism list. Again, in the 1990s, Saddam
was again on the terrorism list in 1998 the United
States put (the) MEK on the terrorism list, in 2012
they took them off the terrorism list. This is a game.
This game needs to stop.1
Considering the gravity of the terrorist designation as it
undergirds the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the maximum
pressure policy of the Trump administration, Zarif’s question
regarding the logic of its application seems not only appropriate
but arguably required. The listing and delisting of Iraq during and
following the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), in which the United
States provided military and intelligence support for Iraq, suggests
that the designation may have indeed been used as an instrument of
convenience. Additionally, the listing of Iran on the state sponsors
of terrorism list in 1984 allowed for a simultaneous legitimization
of sanctions applied to the country. Then, in 2013, the delisting of
the MEK enabled the recognition and support of the opposition
1

Iran’s Zarif grabs #MSC2019 spotlight (YouTube, February 17, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GLDXrAXRZdc.
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group which openly advocates for the end of the legitimate
government of Iran. Both lists give the impression through their
names and through depictions in U.S. news media that they are
reserved for the identification and punishment of terrorist actions,
but Zarif’s example provides potential evidence to the contrary.
Indeed, the designation of terrorist, terrorist organization, or state
sponsor of terrorism, is used regularly in foreign policy. It is used
to imply legitimacy or provide rationale to the application of
sanctions and cooperation, or in the case of the Trump
administration and the JCPOA, non-cooperation with international
law. Therefore, a historical examination of Foreign Minister
Zarif’s response is not only warranted but necessary. Moreover,
are the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) and state sponsors of terrorism lists created to reflect actual
terrorist threats or are they merely a foreign policy tool in a larger
geo-political game played by the United States as posited by Zarif?
In this paper, I will examine the history of these lists and their
applications using the examples of Iran, Iraq, and the MEK as
provided by Zarif’s response.
To achieve these goals, this paper will analyze Iranian
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s statements made at the Munich
Security Conference in order to determine if the United States has
used the label of “terrorism” as it pertains to the FTO and SST lists
to further hegemonic ambitions, a charge levied by critics.2 To
provide the necessary context for this analysis, the paper first
addresses the creation and intended use of the U.S. State
Department state sponsors of terrorism and Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTO) lists by identifying the legislation that created
them, the history of their use, and the requirements for and the
consequences of being listed and delisted by drawing from official
State Department releases. The examples provided by Foreign
Minister Zarif in Munich will then be individually pursued: the
listing of Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979, its 1982
2

Paul Pillar, “The Corruption of the Terrorist Group List,” LobeLog, April 15,
2019, https://lobelog.com/the-corruption-of-the-terrorist-group-list/.
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removal, and participation in the Iran-Iraq War with United States
support, the listing of Iran in 1983, and subsequent relisting of Iraq
in 1990 with the invasion of Kuwait. As per Zarif’s statement, an
examination of the history of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and
its status on and off the FTO list will follow. Although, first, it is
essential to introduce the current climate of U.S.-Iran relations.
Background
In January 2020, it appeared that open warfare between the United
States and Iran was a very likely possibility. The January 4
assassination of General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s
Qud’s Force branch of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps
(IRGC), by the U.S. and the subsequent promises of Iranian
retribution, acted as the most recent catalyst. Relations have cycled
between cautiously optimistic and bitterly hostile since the 1979
Iranian Revolution, the two nations are now experiencing an
unprecedented era of antagonism and uncertainty. On May 18,
2018, President Trump announced that the United States would be
unilaterally withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement, known
as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This
agreement was signed in 2015 by Iran and the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council (the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, China, and Russia) as well as
Germany, known collectively as the P5 + 1. Widely considered to
be a monumental achievement in international nonproliferation
security architecture, the signing of the JCPOA had been described
as an opportunity to “open the way to a new chapter in
international relations” and “a sign of hope for the entire world.”3
Having taken over two years of intense direct talks on top of
twelve years of tension directly related to Iran’s development of
civilian nuclear energy (which the United States contends had a
3

Julian Borger, “Iran Nuclear Deal Reached in Vienna,” The Guardian
(Guardian News and Media, July 14, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/14/iran-nuclear-deal-expected-tobe-announced-in-vienna.
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nuclear weapons adjunct), the motivation for the negotiation of the
JCPOA was to allow Iran to escape the numerous sanctions applied
to their economy, which had cost Iran $160 billion in oil revenue
alone between 2012 and 2016, while ensuring the country did not
develop nuclear weapon capabilities. This goal was to be
accomplished through enrichment limits, international inspections,
and monitoring.4 When the JCPOA was signed in 2015, the mood
between Iran and the United States was cautiously hopeful as the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which
established the JCPOA as international law, called on all
signatories to facilitate trade and commerce with Iran, which
includes the United States.5 Such an arrangement was a major
departure from the decades of sanctions and mutual vitriol since
the Iranian Revolution in 1979. While Iran immediately and fully
complied with all aspects of the agreement according to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran was not able to
enjoy the benefits associated with the agreement as President
Obama refused to fully remove sanctions against the country as
stipulated by the JCPOA. The Obama administration cited Iran’s
alleged “support for terrorism and violations of human rights” as
justification for keeping certain sanctions in place.6 While this
decision dampened the newfound tone of U.S.-Iran cooperation
4

“Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post (WP Company),
accessed April 12, 2020,
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-irannuclear-deal/1651/. It should be noted that Iran signed in the NPT in 1970 and
the Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa barring and denouncing the development
of nuclear weapons under Islamic law.
5
The JCPOA introduced caps on uranium enrichment, stockpiling, and
centrifuges in return for a gradual lifting of sanctions and the normalizing of
Iran on the international stage. Members' Research Service, “U.S.
Decertification of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” European Parliamentary Research
Service Blog, October 20, 2017, https://epthinktank.eu/2017/10/20/usdecertification-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/.
6
“Remarks by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal,” National Archives and
Records Administration (National Archives and Records Administration),
accessed November 17, 2019, https://obamawhitehoU.S..e.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/08/05/remarks-president-iran-nuclear-deal).
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ushered in by the agreement, the potential for a new era of
diplomacy did not fully come to an end until the unilateral
withdrawal of the United States under the following presidential
administration.
While on the campaign trail, then-presidential candidate
Donald Trump regularly derided the still-landmark agreement and
referred to it as “the worst deal ever.”7 Following Trump’s election
in 2016, the incoming administration’s first National Security
Advisor, Michael Flynn, made the vague threat of “officially
putting Iran on notice” for their “support for terrorism,” among
other alleged grievances. Verbal threats and accusations turned to
policy implementation after continual changes in the new
administration’s key foreign policy positions ultimately saw the
appointment of neoconservative hawks and Iran hardliners,
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor
John Bolton. With these two long-time Iran critics and open
advocates of “regime change” now at the helm of U.S. Middle East
foreign policy, the relationship between the two nations managed
to deteriorate further.8 In declaring the unilateral withdrawal of the
United States from the JCPOA in May 2018, President Trump
called the agreement “decaying and rotten structure … defective at
its core” and cited Iran’s alleged support for terrorism, calling the
country “the leading sponsor of terror.”9 With the United States’
7

F. Brinley Bruton, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?” NBCNews.com
(NBCUniversal News Group, May 10, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/smart-facts/what-iran-nuclear-dealn868346.
8
“Regime change” is a term used to describe a goal of foreign policy that is
aimed at removing an existing governing body and replacing it with an
ostensibly more (open/cooperative) one. The United States has employed this
policy at various points throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, i.e.
9
“Donald Trump Says U.S. Will Leave ‘Decaying, Rotten’ Iran Nuclear Deal,”
South China Morning Post, May 9, 2018,
https://www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2145246/trumptells-frances-macron-us-will-withdraw-iran) It is important to note that President
Trump made this decision despite the strong opposition of military advisors and
several members of his own administration as well as European leaders of other
signatory countries. Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He
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withdrawal from the agreement, so too came the reinstatement of
extraterritorial sanctions, meaning the application of sanctions on
other countries doing business with Iran. This began the Trump
administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. As part of this
campaign, Mike Pompeo laid out a twelve-point list of demands
from Iran as conditions that need to be met to enter into a new
nuclear deal with the United States. The twelve-points included
extremely restrictive foreign policy, military, and nuclear power
demands of the country while citing Iran’s alleged terror support:
“providing the IAEA with unqualified access to all sites in the
entire country, end its proliferation of ballistic missiles,” “end
support to Middle East “terrorist” groups,” and “end the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard corps-linked Quds Force’s support for
“terrorist” and “militant” partners around the world.”10 Other
elements of the Trump administration’s maximum pressure
campaign have included a military build-up in the Persian Gulf and
listing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization, which is the first time a nation’s military
has been added to the U.S. State Department list.
The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA was
largely met with global condemnation and considerable diplomatic
efforts from the remaining signatories (China, Russia, and the
“E3/EU-3” France, Britain, and Germany) to save the deal by
continuing to uphold their commitments. The official Iranian
policy following the U.S. withdrawal was one of “strategic
patience” which called on Iran to maintain its original
commitments for one year to allow the United States to rejoin the
agreement and other signatories to uphold their commitments. As
of May 2019, one year post-U.S. withdrawal from the deal, with no
Long Scorned,” The New York Times (The New York Times, May 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nucleardeal.html.
10
“President Donald J. Trump’s New Strategy on Iran,” The White House (The
United States Government), accessed April 13, 2020,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumpsnew-strategy-iran/.
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sanctions relief from the United States in sight and no action taken
by the E3 signatories to ameliorate Iran’s economic condition, Iran
began to scale back its commitments as allowed by articles 26 and
36 of the JCPOA, which function as a failsafe for the signatories
should the other parties not uphold their responsibilities as required
by international law.11 Part of the effort to mitigate the fallout of
the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has been a massive
diplomatic campaign. Chief in this undertaking has been Iranian
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, an original architect of
the JCPOA and Iran’s top diplomat, who has met with world
leaders to call on signatories to uphold their commitments and urge
the United States to rejoin the agreement.
Foreign Terrorist Organization List (FTO) and State Sponsors
of Terrorism (SST)
The state sponsors of terrorism (SST)12 list, as described by the
U.S. State Department is a list of countries that “have repeatedly
provided support of international terrorism” and has been in
perpetual use since its creation in 1979 under the Export
Administration Act of 1979.13 The original list included Libya,
11

“Full Text of the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post (WP Company),
accessed November 17, 2019,
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/full-text-of-the-irannuclear-deal/1651/.
12
For the purposes of this paper, the acronym SST will be used when discussing
the U.S. State Department list of state sponsors of terrorism. This acronym is not
utilized in official documents.
13
“State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S.
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 17, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/) Note that the EAA’79 has
been in a state of flux since its inception (including being repealed nearly in its
entirety and essentially replaced with the Export Controls Act of 2018). Since
2001 sections of the EAA’79 have been renewed by executive order under the
International Emergency Powers Act.
“State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S.
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 17, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/.
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Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria. The U.S. Secretary of State is given
jurisdiction to determine if a country in question has “repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated
pursuant to three laws: section1254(c) of the Export Controls Act
of 2018 (ECA), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA).”14 There are currently four countries listed as state
sponsors by the U.S. State Department: Syria, Iran, Sudan, and
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea).15 Only Iraq
and North Korea have experienced periods off the list only to be
relisted at a later time, the circumstances of which will be
examined in more detail below.
The ECA, FAA, and the AECA not only form the legal
basis for state sponsor of terrorism designation but also provide the
conditions for delisting and allowances for presidential waivers.
There are two possible pathways afforded by the three statues that
allow for a country to be removed from the U.S. State
Department’s SST list. The first stipulates that the President
reports and certifies to congress that “(i) there has been a
fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the
government of the country concerned; (ii) that government is not
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (iii) that government
has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international
terrorism in the future.”16 The second potential pathway is a
certification to Congress 45 days prior to the proposed rescission
that the government in question has not “provided any support for
acts of international terrorism during the preceding 6-month
period” and has assured that it will not in the future.17 The first
14

“State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State.”
Syria (listed: 12/29/1979), Iran (1/19/1984), Sudan (8/12/1993) and
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) (1988, relisted
11/20/2017).
16
Dianne E. Rennack, “State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism -Legislative Parameters: in Brief,” State sponsors of acts of international
terrorism -- legislative parameters: in brief § (n.d.),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/.
17
Rennack, “State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism.”
15
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option necessitates that the president inform a larger body of
officials, including the House and Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs as stipulated by the ECA, whereas the FAA and AECA
require reporting to only the Speaker of the House and the Foreign
Relations Committee Chairperson.18 Congress is afforded the
power through the AECA to block the delisting of a country
through enacting a joint resolution during the 45-day period prior
to rescission.19 In addition, each of the three statutes provides the
President the authority to utilize waivers. These waivers allow the
President to waive restrictions outlined in the three statutes that
undergird the designation of state sponsor of terrorism. For
instance, the President may use this waiver authority if they
determine the transaction would be “essential to the national
security interest of the United States.”20 Similarly, Congress can
circumvent restrictions through the implementation of the language
“notwithstanding any other provision of law” to annual
appropriations.21 Therefore, both the Executive and Legislative
branches have the ability to exercise their own prerogative to
overlook the provisions laid out by the ECA, FAA, and AECA. In
other words, countries may be removed from the “terrorist lists”
for reasons having nothing to do with terrorism.
While the SST list applies to the state level, the U.S. State
Department can target substate actors through the designation of
Foreign Terrorist Organization. The Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) list was created from the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which was an amendment of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, section 219.22 This amendment
authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a “foreign
terrorist organization.” For such a determination to be made, these
18

Ibid.
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Congressional Research Service, The “FTO List” and Congress: Sanctioning
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin, Cong.,
1-2.
19

148

Melissa Sanford

three conditions, as defined by title 8 section 1189 of the United
States Code, must be met:
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined
in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2)
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the
capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or
terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must
threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national
security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic
interests) of the United States.23
This determination is ultimately that of the Secretary of State and
he or she may add an organization to the list at any time.24
Designations last for two years and are then subject to review and
must be renewed for an organization to remain listed. Following
the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks, the act was
amended through the U.S. Patriot Act, thereby increasing the scope
of the designation to include “organizations engaged in terrorism
and organizations retaining the capability and intent to engage in
terrorist activity or terrorism” and allows for perpetual redesignations of an organization.25 Once on the list, an organization

23

“Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed
February 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
24
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” The “FTO list” and Congress: sanctioning
designated foreign terrorist organizations § (2003),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/. The determination to make a designation is
made in cooperation with interagency intelligence.
25
Eric Bronxmeyer, “The Problems of Security and Freedom: Procedural Due
Process and the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,” Berkeley Journal of International
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designation, as per section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), may be revoked “at any time…if the Secretary finds
that – (i) the circumstances that were the basis for the designation
have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation; or (ii) the
national security of the United States warrants a revocation.”26
This allows for the Secretary of State to delist any organization at
any time for reasons that may or may not have to do with
terrorism, as Section 1189 defines “national security” as “the
national defense, foreign relations or economic interests of the
United States.”27
Organizations and states that are listed on either the SST or
FTO are subject to a number of legal ramifications. Designation as
a state sponsor of terrorism results in the issuing of economic
sanctions, which include “restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance; a
ban on defense exports and sales; certain controls of dual use
items; and miscellaneous financial restrictions.”28 As noted above,
there are allowances for Presidential waivers to be made, as well as
language that Congress can implement to sidestep these
restrictions. Importantly, sanctions are not limited to the designated
country but can be extended to other countries that engage with
designated state sponsors. For the FTO, as per Section 1189, these
restrictions extend to “a person in the United States or subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide ‘material
support or resources’”29 and is barred admission to the United
Law 22, no. 3 (2004): pp. 439-488, https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38M63R, p.441,
443.
26
[US C02] 8 USC Ch. 12: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, accessed
November 18, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USCprelim-title8-chapter12&edition=prelim.
27
Ibid.
28
“State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States Department of State,” U.S.
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 17, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/. Dual use goods are
technology and software that have both civilian and military applications.
29
Examples of material support or resources include property, currency,
services, training, weapons, personnel, transportation, and expert advice or
assistance among other tangible and intangible resources “Foreign Terrorist
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States.30 Additionally, any assets of the organization may be frozen
and all financial transactions blocked.31 Regarding goals and
intended effects of these ramifications, the U.S. State Department
website explains, “FTO designations play a critical role in our fight
against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support
for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the
terrorism business.”32
In addition to the FTO and State Sponsor lists, Executive
Order 13224, which was signed two weeks following the
September 11 attacks, gives the Secretary of State and the Treasury
authority to designate foreign individuals or entities as Specially
Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).33 These individuals or
entities are determined to “have committed, or pose a significant
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States.”34 On July 31, 2019, this designation had
been extended to Mohammad Javad Zarif, blocking any property
or finances he may have in the United States and severely limiting

Organizations - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State
(U.S. Department of State), accessed November 18, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/).
30
“Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State, accessed
February 9, 2019, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
31
[USC02] 8 USC Ch. 12: IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY, accessed
November 18, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USCprelim-title8-chapter12&edition=prelim, sec c.
32
“Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States
Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State),
accessed November 18, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-andstate-sponsors-of-terrorism/#state.
33
“Terrorist Designations and State Sponsors of Terrorism - United States
Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (U.S. Department of State),
accessed November 18, 2019, https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designations-andstate-sponsors-of-terrorism/#state.
34
“Terrorism Designations FAQs - United States Department of State,” U.S.
Department of State (U.S. Department of State), accessed November 18, 2019,
https://www.state.gov/terrorism-designations-faqs/.
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his ability to travel to the U.S.35 Bearing this in mind, let us return
to parse Zarif’s statement from the Munich Security Conference.
In 1984, the United States removed Saddam
Hussein from its terrorism list and put Iran on its the
(sic) terrorism list. Again, in the 1990s, Saddam
was again on the terrorism list…
Iraq was among the original countries listed as a state
sponsor of terrorism (SST) when the list was created in 1979. Its
support for the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), Kurdistan Workers
Party, Abu Nidal (ANO), the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), and other Palestinian groups, are cited as the primary
motivation for including Iraq on the original list.36 This listing was
but one more step in the increasingly strained diplomatic relations
between the U.S. and Iraq. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,
Iraq ended diplomatic relations with the United States because of
U.S. support for Israel during the war. In the years that followed,
Iraq and the Soviet Union forged closer ties, which included Soviet
access to Iraqi naval and air bases and Soviet furnishing of arms to
Iraq. With the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the establishment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States was faced with a
new reality which necessitated a new strategic approach in the
Middle East. The pursuit to build a new alliance resulted in
renewed diplomatic ties with Iraq as evidenced by the 1983
delisting as an SST, military and intelligence support during the
Iran-Iraq War, and facilitating the use of chemical weapons, a

35

“U.S. Department of the Treasury,” Treasury Designates Iran's Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif for Acting for the Supreme Leader of Iran, October 22,
2019, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm749.
36
Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built
Saddams War Machine (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997), 11.
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violation of international humanitarian law as reflected in the
Geneva Conventions.37
Though exact numbers remain uncertain, it is estimated that
there were more than one and a half million casualties that resulted
from the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).38 The origins of this brutal
eight-year conflict lay in disagreements concerning the 1975
Algiers Agreement, which was an endeavor to alleviate issues that
fostered tensions in the years prior and in the fundamental
differences in worldview between Saddam Hussein’s secular
nationalist Ba’ath Party and Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary
universalist Shia Islam. The Iran-Iraq War was intended to be a
short military operation as Saddam counted on post-revolutionary
Iran to be in disarray, thereby allowing for an easy victory. Instead,
Saddam’s forces were met with considerable strength. Ultimately,
the war came to its close with the signing of a UN-sponsored
cease-fire on August 20, 1988.39 The eight years of war changed
nothing in terms of territorial borders and only served to strengthen
the morale of the Islamic Republic, both of which were in
opposition to Saddam’s intended goals, as well as those of the
United States.
One element illuminated by this conflict was the
willingness for the United States to supply Iraq, in the form of
arms and intelligence, in the hopes of gaining a regional ally,
preventing Soviet influence, and weakening the Islamic Republic,
all of which were facilitated by and motivations for the delisting of
Iraq as a SST. The desire for a new ally was born out of the
strategic loss of Iran in 1978. Prior to the revolution, Iran was the
most valuable and most cultivated ally in the region and, along
with Saudi Arabia, was considered one of the “Twin Pillars” of
37

For an extensive archive of declassified documents detailing this U.S. role in
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U.S. Middle Eastern policy. The establishment of this relationship
is detailed by Mark Gasiorowski, who examines the nature of the
U.S.-Iran client-patron relationship. A client-patron, or client,
relationship is one in which a patron country trades economic aid
and security assistance to a smaller client country. In return for this
aid, the client country acts as a regional policeman and provides
joint military and intelligence operations, as well as allowing the
placement of military bases.40 From the 1953 U.S.-backed coup, in
which the CIA and MI6 successfully unseated Iranian Prime
Minister Mossadegh, to the end of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1978,
the United States supplied Iran with economic and security aid in
return for “regional stability.” Importantly, this client-patron
relationship was instrumental in bringing about the Islamic
Revolution.41 As a result of the Islamic Revolution, the United
States lost the central pillar that made up the basis of the Twin
Pillars strategy. The United States then looked to Iraq to take Iran’s
place.
At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States
hoped for the two countries to weaken each other with essentially
no victor (as evidenced in “allowing” Israel to supply Iran with
arms (Iran-Contra).42 But by 1982, it was evident that Iran was
more likely to prove successful in the conflict and thus U.S.
support for Iraq became more overt. By delisting Iraq from the
State Sponsors of Terrorism, the United States was able to
legitimize U.S. support of Iraq through supplies, both economic
and military, and to better facilitate a friendly relationship between
the countries. Indeed, the desire to create such a relationship can be
40
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seen immediately following the Iranian Revolution, as evidenced
by comments made by the Carter administration’s National
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, when he encouraged the
United States to “compensate for the loss of its Iranian pillar by
tilting toward Iraq” and argued that “we see no fundamental
incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq. We
do not feel that American Iraqi relations need to be frozen in
antagonism.”43 While the United States did desire a new ally, the
beginning of support for Iraq was more to do with preventing a
clear victory. Had Iraq lost its war against Iran, Middle Eastern
dynamics concerning the United States, its allies, and the region’s
oil production would have completely changed. It was therefore
argued that overt support for Iraq to prevent such a situation was
necessary.
The solidification of U.S. support for Iraq came with the
removal of the country from the SST list, though support was
provided even prior to its removal. In a 1992 New York Times
article, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh reported on
evidence that the United States had been covertly supplying Iraq
since at least 1982. Hersh describes how this support was in direct
opposition to the publicized Reagan administration stance of
neutrality on the Iran-Iraq War. The support provided to Iraq prior
to its delisting closely resembles the forms of support provided
later, taking on the form of intelligence sharing and the sale of
American-made arms.44 Hersh provides a quote from a U.S. State
official which succinctly describes the position of the United
States’ support for Iraq, “it was agreed that the public policy of the
Administration, to remain even-handed, was not in the national
interest [but it was] decided that it was not in the national interest
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to publicly announce a change in the policy.”45 By 1984, the
United States was prepared to begin backing Iraq more directly,
although it appears that the shift from a public appearance of
neutrality to an overt backing still remained quiet. For example, the
New York Times reported that “apparently without consulting
Congress, the Administration has quietly dropped Iraq…from a list
of countries barred from receiving American weapons because
they ‘have repeatedly supported act of international terrorism.’”46
The move to delist Iraq opened the door for the United States to
provide even more economic and military aid.
The delisting of Iraq from the State Department list of
nations sponsoring terrorism in 1983, under the Reagan
administration, helped legitimize U.S. support for Iraq, in the form
of supplying intelligence and arms and dual use technology sales,
despite the fact that the United States was already providing prior
support. By removing Iraq from the list, export controls were
loosened, and an intelligence-sharing initiative was further
fostered.47 With Iraq off the list, the U.S. was now eligible to
provide financed export credits and direct sales of military and
dual-use technology. As the war progressed, it became more
apparent that the conflict would not result in an easy defeat of Iran,
U.S. support for Iraq became increasingly more direct and came at
a great price.48
45
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Perhaps the best example of U.S. support of Iraq, and the
profound cost at which it came, was the attempt to conceal the
furnishing of helicopters used to deploy illegal chemical weapons.
Immediately following the removal of Iraq from the state sponsors
of terrorism list, the Reagan administration sold Iraq Hughes MD500 Defender helicopters and Bell UH-1 helicopters.49 Though it
was argued that these helicopters were specifically used for
civilian purposes, these crafts can be easily weaponized for
military purposes in a very short period of time. Former National
Security Council official Howard Teicher admitted that the UH-1
helicopter “could be easily modified by the Iraqis to carry machine
guns and transport troops.”50 The stated reason for the need for
such helicopters was that they were required to spray crops, but it
has since been argued that they were used to deploy chemical
weapon attacks.51 The Reagan administration was aware of
Saddam’s use of chemical weapons as Iran had been reporting the
use of chemical warfare to the United Nations well before asking
for a formal investigation in 1983. In a declassified 1983 State
Department briefing on “Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons
(CW),” it was concluded that “Iraq had used domesticallyproduced lethal CW in its war with Iran. [redacted]. Such use
violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”52 The briefing goes on to state
that “Iraqi CW capability was developed in part through the
unwitting and, in some cases, we believe with the assistance of a
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number of Western firms.”53 On March 2, 1988, Iraq underwent its
most extensive use of chemical weapons on the civilian Iraqi
Kurdish population of Halabja, in which 5,000 people were
killed.54 The lethal nerve agents sarin, mustard gas, and VX were
dropped on the city’s population.55 Prior to the tragedy at Halabja,
Iran had brought before the UN Security Council the issue of Iraq
utilizing chemical weapons, including in 1984 when Iran brought
before the UNSC the claim that CW had been used on 49
occasions, killing 12,000 and wounding 5,000 between 1981 and
1984.56 Each time, the United States either utilized its veto power
to prevent the cases from being heard or paid very little attention to
the claims.57
The United States continued to support Iraq after the ceasefire that brought the Iran-Iraq War to an end on August 20, 1988. It
would not be until the Iraqi invasion of neighboring U.S. ally
Kuwait on August 2, 1990 that the U.S. again designated the
country as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iraq was placed back on the
SST list the following September, just weeks after the invasion, as
the United States, under the George H.W. Bush administration,
decided to intervene by leading Operation Desert Shield and
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Storm.58 It is important to note that the support of the United States
during and after the Iran-Iraq War led directly to the invasion of
Kuwait, as Saddam felt that the U.S. would continue to back the
country.59 The following years saw the enforcement of crippling
sanctions on Iraq under the Clinton administration.60 Ultimately,
Iraq was delisted again in 2004 following the 2003 U.S. invasion
and the end of the Saddam regime. It is important to note that
neither the delisting of Iraq in 1983 nor the relisting in 1990 had to
do with the country supporting terrorism.
Shortly following Iraq’s delisting in late 1983, Iran was
designated as an SST on January 19, 1984 where it remains to this
day. In addition to the listing of Iran, so too came the
implementation of Operation Staunch, which first launched in the
Spring of 1983, which aimed to restrict arms to Iran.61 Iran’s
position on the list has helped provide U.S. presidential
administrations with justification for maintaining sanctions on the
country in the subsequent decades. Indeed, President Obama cited
this for maintaining certain sanctions post signing of the JCPOA in
2015.
Having explored the example of the circumstances
surrounding the SST designation of Iran and Iraq, let us return to
Zarif’s quote: “...1998 the United States put [the] MEK on the
terrorism list, in 2012 they took them off the terrorism list.”
One of the opposition groups born out of the violent
repression of dissident voices in the early 1960s under Shah
58
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Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and the CIA/MOSSAD-trained state
secret police force, SAVAK, was the Mujahedeen-e Khalq
(MEK).62 The MEK partook in guerilla activities along with other
groups that formed during this time of repression.63 These
activities included a number of bombings, assassinations, and the
attempted kidnapping of members of the royal family and U.S.
personnel stationed in Iran.64 Despite the Shah’s violent repression,
the MEK and related groups remained active underground, later
reemerging in the lead up to and during the revolution. Following
the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the MEK were denounced and exiled
by Ayatollah Khomeini after the group sought to overthrow the
new regime following disputes over the constitutional referendum.
The organization then began a terror campaign in which 70 high
ranking Iranian officials were killed through the bombing of the
Prime Minister’s and Islamic Republic Party offices in 1981.65
These attacks then, in turn, resulted in targeting of the MEK by the
new Iranian government and its supporters. As a result, MEK
leadership, including the group’s leader Masoud Rajavi, fled to
France. Following their expulsion from that country in 1981, they
then established themselves in Iraq, where their military wing
joined Saddam Hussein’s forces in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War
and supported the suppression of Shiites and Kurds during the first
Gulf War.66 Additionally, the MEK have undertaken terror
62
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activities during the 1990s and early 2000s, targeting Iranian
civilians and leadership. These included attacks on Iranian
embassies and consular missions in thirteen countries, a bombing
and mortar attack in Iran that killed fifteen people, attacks on the
offices of the Supreme Leader and President, and the assassination
of the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier General,
Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.67
Since the MEK’s falling out with the Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini, the group has maintained a steadfast goal of
overthrowing Iran’s government. A U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation report on criminal investigations of the organization
in 2004 describes this goal as “a romantic view of a utopian society
in Iran run by the MEK. They have even set up a government made
up of NLA and NCR members that will assume power when they,
in their minds, ultimately, take control of Iran.”68 Indeed, the
organization has “voted” Maryam Rajavi as president-in-exile with
the intention of her assuming this role once the proposed
overthrow takes place. It should be made clear that the MEK does
not have any support within Iran where they are widely reviled, in
part because of their support of Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War.
As per the 2011 State Department report on the MEK, “the
group's worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses
propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives.”69 This
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includes a history of violence against U.S. citizens. Among these
incidents are the 1972 bombing in the Tehran U.S. Information
Service office, the 1973 assassination of the U.S. Military Mission
chief, the 1976 assassination of two U.S. Military Assistance
Advisory Group members and two U.S. citizens in Tehran.70 While
the MEK denies its involvement, the U.S. State Department
determined that, “MEK members participated in and supported the
1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and that the MEK
later argued against the early release of the American hostages.
The MEK also provided personnel to guard and defend the site of
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran following the takeover of the
Embassy.”71 These are among the cited reasons for the original
FTO designation of the MEK in 1997.72
Prior to the delisting in 2012, the MEK and the United
States have had a convoluted relationship. In 2003, Saddam’s
sheltering and support of the MEK, the sponsoring of a designated
terrorist group, was cited among the motivations for the invasion
of Iraq. Interestingly, in 2004, one year after the occupation of
Iraq, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld extended
protected persons status under the Fourth Geneva Convention,
thereby allowing for the U.S. to aid the group while it remained a
designated FTO.73 In 2002, the NCRI, the political front of the
MEK, held a press conference in which it revealed the alleged
existence of two secret nuclear sites, as well as a laptop containing
information on a secret Iranian nuclear arms facility that was given
to the organization by a former nuclear scientist. These claims
have since been found to be incorrect and vastly overstated.74
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Then, in 2012, it was revealed by Seymour Hersh that the United
States had been providing training to the MEK at a site in Nevada
from 2004 to approximately 2007.75 This revelation demonstrates
the U.S. violating its own sanctions placed on entities listed on the
FTO which stipulates that it is illegal to aid or support a designated
organization. This training also potentially implicates the United
States in the assassinations of five Iranian nuclear scientists which
took place between 2007 and 2012, which have been strongly
linked to the MEK in cooperation with the Israeli secret service,
Mossad.76 Finally, in 2009, Iraq required that the MEK leave the
country and take up residence elsewhere or repatriate to Iran. The
United States then aided the group in resettling in Albania where
they are based currently. Throughout this period, United States
policy makers and politicians received money from the MEK in
exchange for speaking engagements including John Bolton, who
would later be instrumental in the U.S. leaving the JCPOA.
A U.S. Treasury Department investigation in 2012 found
that prominent U.S. officials had been receiving monetary
compensation for speaking engagements made on behalf of the
MEK. Among those who have accepted payment are former
Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell, ex-FBI Director Louis Freeh,
former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, former New York City
Mayor and personal lawyer to President Trump, Rudy Giuliani,
and former United Nations Ambassador and National Security
advisor John Bolton.77 Similar paid speaking engagements have
continued into 2018 with Giuliani and Bolton still among the
speakers. During one of these rallies, in February 2018, John
75
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Bolton declared to the gathering, “the declared policy of the United
States should be the overthrow of the mullahs’ regime in
Tehran…And that’s why, before 2019, we here will celebrate in
Tehran!”78 The compensation for speaking at these MEK
engagements, wherein promises of making regime change in Iran
come true are central, ranges between $15,000-$30,000.79
Although, now that the MEK are no longer a designated FTO, such
an action is no longer in violation of the statutes that undergird it
but considering the fact that the group still maintains an Iranian
regime change goal and the official foreign policy towards the
country is one of maximum pressure, the motivations surrounding
the delisting should be examined.
The decision to remove the MEK from the Foreign
Terrorist Organizations list came in 2012, following an extensive
lobbying effort from the group with U.S. supporters citing concern
for the group’s safety as motivation for removal. Daniel Benjamin,
former State Department counterterrorism director who worked
closely on the delisting effort states “I supported the delisting for
the simple reason that it was a humanitarian necessity. It was
humanitarian to prevent them from getting slaughtered, and not
because they had become a peaceful group, or the United States
believed they were completely without a nefarious design. Would
the MEK have been delisted absent the situation in Iraq? I don’t
[think] there’s any question they would not have been.”80 The
decision came under Hillary Clinton, then-acting Secretary of State
under President Barack Obama. Among those who lobbied and
supported the delisting were “R. James Woolsey and Porter J.
78
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Goss, former C.I.A. directors; Louis J. Freeh, the former F.B.I.
director; President George W. Bush’s homeland security
secretary, Tom Ridge, and attorney general, Michael B. Mukasey;
and President Obama’s first national security adviser, Gen. James
L. Jones.”81 What is noteworthy about this list of individuals is
that they are not representatives of humanitarian groups, nor have
they been known to champion humanitarian causes. Therefore,
suspicion regarding their lobbying in support of delisting the MEK
for humanitarian reasons is arguably justified.
“…this is a game. This game needs to stop.”
Having used Mohammad Javad Zarif’s quote as a starting point for
examining the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist
Organizations and state sponsors of terrorism list, what insight into
the use of these lists have we learned? The U.S. State Department
maintains the Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the state
sponsors of terrorism lists for the stated purpose of identifying,
maligning, and deterring terrorist activity. The legislation that
undergirds these lists employ language that defines these activities
while leaving room for interpretation based on national interests,
allowing for the sitting administration to apply designations based
on foreign policy interests. This results in the application of these
lists to ostensibly vary from administration-to-administration and
their corresponding foreign policy agendas. Additionally, there are
instances in the history of these lists wherein a country or
organization’s designation on or off the list is made irrespective of
terrorism. Foreign policy motivations that are not concerned with
managing terrorism include removal from the SST to enable
support for a strategic ally as seen in the case of delisting. Also,
these motivations can be seen in the listing and subsequent
sanctioning of a revolutionary state not aligned with the United
81
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States in the case of listing Iran. As well, the delisting to facilitate
support for a cult-like group that has a history of killing U.S.
citizens in the case of the MEK.
Since the stated goal of these lists is to deter and prevent
terrorist activity it is understandable for an observer to conclude
that the motivation for the listing or delisting of a country or
organization to one of these lists is grounded firmly in terrorism.
What we have seen from the above examples is that there are more
factors at work than the matter of terrorist actions and or support.82
If it were the case that these lists were used strictly for monitoring
and sanctioning as punishment for engaging in or supporting
terrorism, then it could be concluded that designated countries and
organizations pose a danger to the United States and the resulting
sanctions placed on them are legitimate. Similarly, other countries
who have demonstrated blatant support for terrorist groups would
be included among the state sponsors list. Saudi Arabia presents a
plain example of a country that should, by all accounts, be
designated as a state sponsor. It was concluded in the 9/11
Commission Report that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers
responsible for the September 11 attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon were from Saudi Arabia. Additionally,
Osama bin Laden, the once head of the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization, was born in Saudi Arabia and maintained ties within
the country. Indeed, the Saudi royal family has been found to have
supported al-Qaeda and other linked groups.83 Yet, this
82
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development yielded no designation or application of sanctions and
Saudi Arabia remains one of the largest buyers of U.S. weapons.
The conclusion that is obvious from this study of the use
and history of the U.S. State Department’s FTO and SST lists is
that Zarif is correct in his description, this is indeed a game. As
illustrated in the examples provided in this paper, this game is
played not with safety and diplomacy in mind, but rather it is
played to serve the interests of the United States, whatever they
may be, under a given administration. And while this may be the
case, it is unlikely for this game to stop, as these lists have proven
to be useful foreign policy tools used to legitimate sanctions, the
maligning of non-U.S. aligned nations, and support for groups and
countries that uphold U.S. interests. As such, it is imperative for
world citizens and observers of United States foreign policy to bear
in mind these historical examples when countries, organizations,
and individuals are placed on or removed from these lists as these
determinations appear to be made more in line with foreign policy
machinations rather than as a legitimate and consistent safeguard.
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